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The Near East School of Theology Beirut, Lebanon C lassical Sunn i eschatology maintains that all those who believe that God is one will enter the Garden of Paradise in due time. Some monotheists may first have to endure punishment and purification in the Fire for their sins, but those with even the least grain of belief will eventually enter the Garden as their reward. Conversely, unbelievers and those who associate partners with God ( mushrik u n ) will spend eternity in Hell-Fire as retribution for their unforgivable error. 1 Classical Sunnism supports punishment of unbelievers and associators in unending Fire with many verses from the Qur 'a n. However, its fundamental warrant for this doctrine is not the Qur 'a n but consensus ( ijm a" ). The classical Sunn i principle of consensus affirms that when the scholars of the Muslim community have agreed on a matter -that Islam has Five Pillars, for example -it is no longer open to discussion. 2 So, the claim here is that the Muslim community has reached a binding consensus that punishment of unbelievers in the Fire will never cease. 3 This claim has not gone uncontested. In copious writings on the duration of the Fire, the Damascene theologian Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) -the leading student of the famed H anbal i jurist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) -presents what may well be the most forthright challenge to the alleged consensus on this doctrine in medieval Islamic thought. The case for the limited duration of chastisement in the Fire did receive careful consideration earlier on as is evident in the vast Qur 'a n commentary of Fakhr al-D i n al-R a z i (d. 606/1209). 4 Nonetheless, Ibn al-Qayyim's discussions appear to be unprecedented in their thoroughness and length. In his argumentation, the Fire no longer functions retributively to punish as in the classical doctrine but therapeutically to cleanse from sins, even the sins of unbelief ( kufr ) and associationism ( shirk ). Does then the punishment of unbelievers come to an end? Does the Fire pass away when its purposes have been attained? As we will see, some scholars have concluded that Ibn al-Qayyim answers these questions affirmatively to yield a doctrine of universal salvation. Yet, closer examination of his texts shows that coming to this conclusion is not as simple as it first appears. This article investigates three lengthy discussions on the duration of punishment and the Fire by Ibn al-Qayyim that come from the later years of his life. These three have emerged in recent controversial literature as the fullest and most significant of Ibn al-Qayyim's deliberations on the topic. 5 I have not undertaken an exhaustive search for additional treatments elsewhere in Ibn al-Qayyim's vast corpus, and no attempt is made here to provide a comprehensive overview of his thought on this subject. Rather, this study seeks to clarify Ibn al-Qayyim's views in the key texts under consideration, note debts to his teacher Ibn Taymiyya, and explore the means by which he circumvents the classical Sunn i consensus.
The Beginnings of Ibn al-Qayyim's Deliberations
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya reveals how he first broached the question of everlasting chastisement with Ibn Taymiyya in an autobiographical note found in his Shif a" al-" al i l ( Healing of the Sick ) [hereafter Shif a" ]: I marked that place [in the book], and I told the messenger, "Say to him, 'This place is difficult for him, and he does not know what it is." Then, he wrote his famous work about it -the mercy of God be upon him. Whoever has the grace of knowledge, let him bring it forth, and above each one having knowledge is one who is All-Knowing (pp. 564-65).
It appears that Ibn Taymiyya was not sure how to respond to Ibn al-Qayyim's first inquiry on the duration of the Fire. He only answered that the question was "very great. A tradition related by ' Abd b. H am i d puzzled Ibn al-Qayyim. So, he marked the spot in the book and sent it to his teacher via messenger. This occurred "while [Ibn Taymiyya] was in his last session," presumably near the end of his life. In reply Ibn Taymiyya composed what Ibn al-Qayyim calls his "famous work." The identity of this work and its date will be clarified below.
In the passage above Ibn al-Qayyim also alludes to having mentioned the puzzling tradition from ' Abd b. H am i d earlier in Shif a". A few pages back, he does indeed cite from 'Abd b. Hamid the following report from 'Umar b. al-Kha † †ab, a Companion of the Prophet and the second Sunni caliph: "Even if the People of the Fire stayed in the Fire like the amount of sand of 'Alij, they would have, despite that, a day in which they would come out" (p. 554). The place name 'Alij refers to a large tract of sand in the desert on the way to Mecca, 8 and the simile "like the amount of sand of 'Alij" in 'Umar's report indicates a very great length of time. Thus, the sense is that those in the Fire will leave it someday even if they remain therein for a very long time.
At the same place in Shifa", Ibn al-Qayyim cites other reports that also cast doubt on the eternity of punishment in Hell-Fire. Two examples will suffice. A report from the Prophet's Companion Abu Hurayra conveys a message similar to that of 'Umar: "There will come to Hell a day when no one will remain in it." The second example counsels withholding judgment about where humans will end up. The Companion Ibn 'Abbas is reported to have said, "It is not necessary for anyone to judge God with respect to His creatures or to assign them to a garden or a fire" (p. 554). Ibn al-Qayyim clearly understands these sundry reports to undermine the classical Sunni consensus that unbelievers and associators will spend eternity in the Fire. But Fortunately, the key to solving the mystery of Ibn al-Qayyim's quotations from Ibn Taymiyya and the latter's own view is now available. In 1995 Muhammad al-Simhari edited and published a treatise by Ibn Taymiyya and gave it the title Al-Radd "ala man qala bi-fana" al-janna wa al-nar (Response to Whoever Says that the Garden and the Fire Will Pass Away). I will call it Fana" al-nar for short. As the editor al-Simhari argues, this brief work is undoubtedly authentic.
14 This is the text that Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya quotes in Hadi, and it conspicuously shapes the structure of his discussion in that book. As will become clear below, Ibn al-Qayyim proceeds through the same topics and arguments in the same order as Ibn Taymiyya but with extensive elaboration and addition. Ibn Taymiyya's text structures Ibn al-Qayyim's discussion in Shifa" as well, but to a lesser degree. Ibn Taymiyya's Fana" al-nar gains added significance in view of Ibn alQayyim's autobiographical note in Shifa" quoted above. There, Ibn al-Qayyim comments that he sent his question about 'Abd b. Hamid's book to Ibn Taymiyya during "his last session" and that his teacher responded with "his famous work." There is little reason to doubt that this "famous work" is Fana" al-nar. Ibn Taymiyya's text gives careful attention to 'Abd b. Hamid's commentary and the report from 'Umar that troubled Ibn al-Qayyim. Moreover, mention of Ibn Taymiyya being in his "last session" strongly suggests that he was near life's end. This is corroborated by references which Caterina Bori has identified showing Fana" al-nar to be the last treatise that Ibn Taymiyya authored. 15 In 
Salafi and Theological Arguments in Fana] al-nar and Hadi
Ibn Taymiyya's Fana" al-nar (p. 41) and Ibn al-Qayyim's corresponding discussion in Hadi (p. 307) both begin by outlining three possible views on the durations of the Garden and the Fire: 1) both pass away, 2) both remain forever, or 3) the Garden remains forever while the Fire passes away. The first of these views is refuted in the first section of Fana" al-nar. The second view is refuted in the third section. The third view is defended in both the second and fourth sections. The discussion in Ibn al-Qayyim's Hadi follows suit. The fifth and final section in Ibn Taymiyya's Fana" al-nar cites Qur'anic verses showing that the Garden will remain forever (pp. 83-87). Ibn al-Qayyim does not go on to treat this matter because he has already attended to it earlier in Hadi (pp. 305-7) just before picking up with Fana" al-nar.
The first section of Fana" al-nar (pp. 42-52) and the parallel discussion in Hadi (pp. 307-11) are devoted to refuting the views of Jahm b. Safwan (d. 128/745) and the early Mu'tazili theologian Abu al-Hudhayl al-'Allah (227/841?). Jahm argues that the impossibility of an infinite series means that both the Garden and the Fire must eventually cease to exist. On a similar basis, Abu al-Hudhayl argues not that the two will pass away entirely but that motion in them must end. Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim respond that an infinite series into the future is possible and that Jahm ignores Qur'anic texts indicating the perpetuity of the Garden. These verses include, "Its food is perpetual" (Q. 13:35), and, "Truly, this is Our provision which is never exhausted" (Q. 38:54).
The second section of Fana" al-nar explores textual support for the Fire passing away or at least that no one will suffer chastisement in it forever (pp. 52-70). Ibn al-Qayyim's matching section in Hadi (pp. 311-18) quotes much of Ibn Taymiyya's content and elaborates similar points. Ibn Taymiyya begins with 'Umar's report cited by 'Abd b. Hamid, "Even if the People of the Fire stayed in the Fire like the amount of sand of 'Alij, they would have, despite that, a day in which they would come out." 'Abd b. Hamid cites this report, explains Ibn Taymiyya, when interpreting the Qur'anic testimony that the residents of Hell will be "staying in it for long stretches of time (labithina fiha ahqaban)" (Q. 78:23) to show that "long stretches of time" does indeed have an end. Ibn Taymiyya also quotes several early exegetical traditions that take "long stretches of time (ahqab)" to mean a period of finite length. To reconcile this with classical Sunni doctrine, it might be argued that the verse applies only to monotheistic sinners and the time they spend in the Fire before entering the Garden.
19 Ibn Taymiyya asserts that this is not so. The verse definitely refers to unbelievers.
Among other points that Ibn Taymiyya makes in this section is that several commentators use Ibn 'Abbas's report, "It is not necessary for anyone to judge God with respect to His creatures or to assign them to a garden or a fire," to explicate the Qur'anic claim that the residents of the Fire will be "abiding in the Fire, as long as the Heavens and the Earth endure, except as your Lord wills" (Q. 11:107). Time spent in the Fire is not everlasting absolutely. Rather, Ibn Taymiyya observes, it is contingent upon both the existence of this world and -as corroborated by Ibn 'Abbas -God's will.
The third section of Ibn Taymiyya's Fana" al-nar (pp. 71-79) and the roughly equivalent section in Ibn al-Qayyim's Hadi (pp. 318 -22) list and refute arguments for the perpetuity (dawam) of the Fire. Only the first two of these need occupy us here, and the second will be treated first because it is quickly explained. This is the argument that the Qur'an supports the perpetuity of the Fire. In reply, Ibn Taymiyya recognizes that the Qur'an says that unbelievers are "abiding in [the Fire] forever (khalidun fiha abadan)" (Q. 4:169, 33:65, etc.). Yet, he avers, the Qur'an never states that the Fire will not pass away. There would seem to be a contradiction here. If unbelievers abide in the Fire forever, how could the Fire pass away? Ibn Taymiyya responds that the residents of Hell will abide in the abode of chastisement only as long as that chastisement lasts. The terms "abiding" (khalid ) and "forever" (abad ) should not be understood in absolute and unqualified senses. This is the same solution to textual difficulties that Ibn Taymiyya employed in the preceding section of Fana" al-nar.
The first and more significant argument for the perpetuity of the Fire is that it is held by consensus (ijma" ), with no conflict over it found among the Salaf (i.e., the early Muslims). Ibn Taymiyya responds that no consensus on this question is known. No one among the Prophet's Companions said that the Fire would never pass away, and the Successors (tabi"un), the second generation after the Prophet, held diverse views on the matter. Thus, Ibn Taymiyya argues, there is no ijma" or consensus that the Fire will remain forever.
This way of conceiving consensus divides Ibn Taymiyya methodologically from the mainstream Sunni scholars of his day, and it is the key to his and Ibn al-Qayyim's Salafi hermeneutic. For Ibn Taymiyya, the only binding consensus is an explicit consensus of the Salaf, the first three generations at most. Thereafter, consensus becomes too difficult to verify. Any consensus by a later generation of scholars is always subject to correction upon discovery of a stronger proof. 20 Thus, when Ibn Taymiyya discovers that there was no agreement among the Salaf on the duration of the Fire, he is willing to rethink the issue. In classical Sunnism, however, matters on which consensus have been reached are no longer open to discussion. So, by virtue of raising this question anew, Ibn Taymiyya is breaking the rules of classical Sunni hermeneutics.
This becomes clearer in Taqi al-Din al-Subki's (d. 756/1355) Al-I"tibar, a refutation of Fana" al-nar written in 1348, twenty years after Ibn Taymiyya's death. 21 Although al-Subki devotes much space to quoting Qur'anic verses supporting the eternity of the Fire, he writes at the very beginning of the treatise, "The doctrine of the Muslims is that the Garden and the Fire will not pass away. Abu Muhammad b. Hazm has transmitted that this is held by consensus and that whoever opposes it is an unbeliever by consensus" (p. 32). That is, to suggest that the Fire is not eternal is to fall directly into unbelief. Al-Subki reiterates this elsewhere in the treatise although he is careful to clarify that he does not label any particular person an unbeliever (pp. 47, 85, 89).
Even more telling is how al-Subki responds to Ibn Taymiyya's charge that there was no consensus among the Salaf. Al-Subki first expresses disbelief that anyone among the Salaf ever said that the Fire would pass away. But then he explains that some statements of the Salaf should not be taken literally. They require reinterpretation (ta"wil ), just as some verses in the Qur'an and reports in the Hadith require reinterpretation. This is especially so in matters of doctrine upon which Muslims are agreed (p. 59). Al-Subki later explains that consensus might legitimately be undermined by "transmission of a clear difference (naql khilaf sarih)." However, he denies that this has occurred on this issue, and he then effectively negates the possibility of a "clear difference" ever emerging by arguing that the reports of the Salaf to which Ibn Taymiyya appeals should be reinterpreted so as "to give a favorable opinion of them [i.e., the Salaf] (tahsinan li-l-zann bihim)" (p. 79). For al-Subki, the classical scholarly consensus is binding and earlier testimony must be read charitably in its light.
Al-Subki's argument from consensus is still invoked today. In a 1986 book on Paradise and the Fire, Sulayman al-Ashqar likewise cites Ibn Hazm's assertion of consensus that the Fire will not pass away, and he maintains that this is "the doctrine of the People of the Sunna and the Community." Al-Ashqar observes that Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim are wrong on this doctrine but should not be censured as unbelievers. They were engaged in creative reasoning from authoritative texts (ijtihad ) and will be rewarded accordingly. If they had been properly informed of the truth, they would have changed to the correct view. Moreover, al-Ashqar explains, early scholars (i.e., Salaf) similarly held views that sometimes disagreed with what eventually became the consensus of the Muslim community. Imam Malik (d. 179/795), for example, maintained that the invocation "In the name of God, the Merciful, the All-Merciful" found at the head of Qur'anic suras was not part of the Qur'an whereas consensus was later reached that it was. Also, 'Umar b. al-Kha † †ab said that a traveler who could not find water did not have to pray whereas it was agreed in due course that a traveler in such circumstances should pray after performing ritual cleansing with sand. 23 Although al-Ashqar does not make the point explicitly, it is clear that he grants a later scholarly consensus precedence over diversity of views among the Salaf. Ibn Taymiyya's Salafi methodology turns the tables on this strategy by making diversity among the Salaf grounds for scrutinizing and reconsidering doctrines prevailing among later scholars. One such doctrine that falls under Ibn Taymiyya's ax, obviously, is the eternity of the Fire, and in this he is followed faithfully by Ibn al-Qayyim.
The fourth section of Ibn Taymiyya's Fana" al-nar (pp. 80-83) and the much longer parallel section in Ibn al-Qayyim's Hadi (pp. 322-41) are cast as a series of differences between the Garden and the Fire. In reality, they constitute arguments for the perpetuity of the Garden and the limited duration of the Fire and chastisement in it. Ibn Taymiyya provides eight arguments. The first five reiterate textual indications for limited duration of the Fire and need not be recounted here. The sixth through eighth are theological. The sixth argument explains that God's mercy (rahma) and forgiveness entail the blessing of the Garden. The Garden remains forever as something following necessarily from God's attributes and names, especially God's forgiveness and mercy. Chastisement, however, may cease because it is only something created. It does not follow necessarily from God's names. This of course does not yet prove definitively that chastisement in the Fire will pass away. For that something more is needed, and this is provided in the seventh argument, where Ibn Taymiyya makes his key theological move. He observes that God's mercy encompasses all things. The Qur'an says, "[God] has written mercy for Himself" (Q. 6:12), and, in the Hadith, we find, "My mercy precedes my anger," 24 and, "My mercy overcomes my anger." 25 So, Ibn Taymiyya reasons, God's mercy precludes chastisement without end. In the eighth argument, Ibn Taymiyya asserts that God has a wise purpose (hikma) in everything that He does. As he cannot imagine God having any wise purpose in creating everlasting chastisement, chastisement is limited, and its wise purpose is cleansing from sins and purifying souls.
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As I have shown elsewhere, Ibn Taymiyya refutes the arguments that support this Ash'ari voluntarism and maintains that God creates everything for wise purposes -evils and all human actions included -such that this is the best possible world. On those few occasions when Ibn Taymiyya is specific about God's wise purposes in evil, he speaks of the lessons that Pharaoh's rebellion and destruction teach us, the humility nurtured by illness and sins, and the expiation of sin gained through suffering. Evil is educational and purifying. It affords opportunity to struggle and advance in the religious life and perfect worship of God alone. 26 Probably more than any other factor, this theological optimism spurs Ibn Taymiyya to reconsider the received doctrine that the Fire is eternal. Reports from the likes of 'Umar and Ibn 'Abbas noted above and the Salafi hermeneutic that allows reading them afresh certainly play their parts, but, more fundamentally, everlasting Fire undermines Ibn Taymiyya's vision of a God who wisely creates all creatures and draws them to love and worship only Him.
This optimism comes into full flower with a strongly therapeutic hue in the much more extensive parallel section of Ibn al-Qayyim's Hadi. Ibn al-Qayyim rejects the Ash'ari notion that God creates some people from the outset to languish eternally in the Fire. He clarifies that God does not create anyone to be an unbeliever essentially. There is no such thing as unbelief and associationism that cannot be removed, and no one is beyond the pale of being made fit for the Garden. God created everyone with a natural constitution ( fi †ra) to love God and confess His unity, and God's wise purpose in chastisement is not vengeance but cleansing (pp. 324-26). The punishment of the Fire is not fundamentally a matter of retribution but therapy. Ibn al-Qayyim writes, "Trial and punishment are the remedies appointed to remove maladies. They are not removed by any other means. And the Fire is the Great Remedy" (p. 332). At another point, he says:
The wise purpose [of God] -Glory be to Him -required that He make a remedy (dawa" ) appropriate to each malady (da" ) and that the remedy for the malady be among the most toilsome of remedies. The Compassionate Physician cauterizes one who is ill with the Fire, cauterization after cauterization, to remove the vile matter besmirching the upright nature (p. 326). 27 Ultimately, argues Ibn al-Qayyim in Hadi, there can be no benefit or profit in everlasting punishment for anyone. It would be of no profit to God because God is above gaining anything from punishing human beings. At the human level, eternal punishment of the wretched does not increase the blessedness of God's beloved, and it certainly is of no benefit to those who suffer under it. Punishment and chastisement can only be a means to a greater end (p. 327).
Similar to Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim also explains in Hadi that the Garden is a necessary product of God's mercy and likewise the Fire a product of God's anger ( ghadab). Now, since we know that God's mercy will overcome God's anger, it follows that the effects of God's mercy will overcome the effects of God's anger (pp. 323-24, 333). Moreover, Ibn al-Qayyim clarifies, God's good pleasure and mercy are essential attributes having no limit while God's anger and wrath are not essential and thus do not need to last forever (p. 327). Ultimately, there is no good reason for evils like the Fire not to end. Ibn al-Qayyim states, "It is not in the divine wise purpose that evils remain perpetually without end and without interruption forever such that [evils] and goods would be equivalent in this" (p. 341).
To review: Ibn Taymiyya never states categorically in Fana" al-nar that the Fire and its chastisement will pass away. However, this is certainly the burden of his argument, and it is not without reason that later critics attribute this view to him. Ibn Taymiyya breaks with the classical Sunni consensus that the Fire is eternal by appealing to diversity among the Salaf. He interprets sayings of the Companions and early exegetical traditions on key Qur'anic texts to support the Fire's passing away, and he employs theological arguments from God's mercy and wise purpose to render the Fire's end inevitable. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya employs the same Salafi hermeneutic and follows Ibn Taymiyya's exegesis and argumentation very closely in Hadi, often elaborating on his teacher. Elaboration is most evident as Ibn al-Qayyim develops his therapeutic rationale for the Fire and its eventual passing. The mercy and wise purpose of God work everything to the benefit of all, and retribution fades far from Ibn al-Qayyim's horizon.
Yet, at the very end of his disquisition in Hadi and after explaining that he has finished presenting arguments for both sides of the issue, Ibn al-Qayyim raises the question of where he himself stands. In reply, he quotes, "Surely your Lord does whatever He wills" (Q. 11:107), and he observes that this was the position of 'Ali b. Abi Talib, the Prophet's Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law. This final comment is so short that it is understandable that Abrahamov and others have not picked up on the agnosticism that it expresses.
28 Yet, it does prevent concluding unreservedly from Hadi that Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya believes that the Fire will pass away. Moreover, Ibn al-Qayyim spells out this agnosticism on the duration of chastisement in the Fire more clearly in another text, his Shifa".
Salafi Agnosticism in Shifa]
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's Shifa" is a large tome on divine determination (qadar), human agency and theodicy. Following in the footsteps of Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim elaborates a theodicy of optimism in which God creates everything in the best possible way for wise purposes. Pure evil does not exist. Evil that exists is evil relative only to those who suffer under it, but it is good in God's overarching wise purpose. In the course of Shifa", Ibn al-Qayyim addresses numerous problems of evil, one of which is everlasting Fire. As Ibn al-Qayyim puts the question, "What pleasure or good ensues from severe chastisement that does not break off or abate?" (p. 540, Ch. 22, part way into Aspect 36).
Ibn al-Qayyim's answer in Shifa" first discusses the natural constitution ( fi †ra) of the human being, how God's mercy overtakes His anger, and textual evidence that chastisement in the Fire does not continue forever (pp. 544-57). Then follow a refutation of proofs for the perpetuity of the Fire (pp. 557-61) and an account of differences between the Garden and the Fire (pp. 561-64). The structural similarities of this treatment to Ibn al-Qayyim's Hadi and Ibn Taymiyya's Fana" al-nar are evident, but in Shifa" Ibn al-Qayyim reorders the material somewhat and writes with greater freedom. This suggests that Shifa" is later than Hadi. However, insufficient work has been done on a chronology of Ibn al-Qayyim's texts to verify this independently. What we do know is that Shifa" is among Ibn al-Qayym's later writings. 29 The arguments in Shifa" are those of Hadi and need not be rehearsed here. However, Ibn al-Qayyim in Shifa" does inquire into what follows necessarily from God's attributes in a sharper and more difficult way. As we saw above, Ibn al-Qayyim argues that mercy and good pleasure are essential attributes of God while anger and wrath are not. Thus, what follows necessarily from God's anger, namely, the Fire, does not have to last forever. Now, what if chastisement is understood to follow not from God's non-essential attribute of anger but necessarily from God's justice ("adl ), might ("izza) and wise purpose? Would not chastisement then be everlasting because it follows from these essential attributes of God? Ibn al-Qayyim rejects this conclusion. Rather, he argues, these attributes are fully operative even when chastisement has achieved its aims. It is not that God's attributes of justice, might and wise purpose no longer function when chastisement ends. It is rather that God's justice, might and wise purpose specify when chastisement is best brought to an end. Chastisement falls entirely within the scope of these attributes, which in turn come under the purview of God's mercy. Here is how Ibn al-Qayyim puts it:
If it is said, "Chastisement emanates from His might, His wise purpose and His justice. These are beautiful names and attributes of perfection. What emanates from them is perpetual by virtue of their perpetuity," it is said, "By God, chastisement indeed emanates from might, wise purpose and justice. The end [of chastisement], when what is intended is obtained, emanates from might, wise purpose and justice.
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Chastisement and its interruption do not fall outside the sphere of His might, His wise purpose and His justice. However, when it ends, might is conjoined with mercy, and mercy is conjoined with liberality, beneficence, pardon and forgiveness. Might and wise purpose do not cease and do not decrease. On the contrary, everything that He created, that He creates, that He commanded and that He commands emanates from His might and His wise purpose" (p. 562).
Apart from this, the most significant new material in Shifa" comes at the end of Ibn al-Qayyim's discussion. Here he relates his encounter with Ibn Taymiyya that produced the "famous work" Fana" al-nar -this passage was quoted above -and then he sets out his own view. As we have seen, Ibn al-Qayyim ends his treatment in Hadi by citing 'Ali b. Abi Talib and very briefly leaving the duration of the Fire to God's will. In Shifa", he makes this agnosticism more explicit by quoting the sayings of several more of the Salaf:
In this issue I follow the statement of the Prince of the Believers 'Ali b. Abi Talib -God be pleased with him. He mentioned that the People of the Garden enter the Garden and the People of the Fire enter the Fire. He described that very well, and then he said, "After that, God does with His creatures what He wills."
And [I] follow the doctrine of 'Abd Allah b. 'Abbas -God be pleased with both of them -where he says, "It is not necessary for anyone to judge God with respect to His creatures or to assign them to a garden or a fire." He mentioned this in his commentary on His statement, "He will say, 'The Fire will be your dwelling place, dwelling in it forever, except as God wills" (Q. 6:128).
And [I] follow the doctrine of Abu Sa'id al-Khudri where he says, "The whole Qur'an comes down to this verse: 'Surely your Lord does whatever He wills" (Q. 11:107). At the end of this passage from Shifa", Ibn al-Qayyim renders theological arguments for the perpetuity of the Fire from God's perpetuity void because they lack any foundation in authoritative texts. Yet, he also does not have a text from the Qur'an and the Hadith saying categorically that the Fire will pass away. To again quote Ibn Zayd: "[God] did not inform us what He wills for the People of the Fire." Moreover, following Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim cannot find any consensus among the Salaf on the matter, and it goes without saying that the classical Sunni consensus on the Fire's perpetuity is of no account to him.
What Ibn al-Qayyim does have are three things. First, he has reports from Companions of the Prophet like 'Umar and Abu Hurayra indicating that everyone will eventually leave the Fire. Second, he has reports from 'Ali, Ibn 'Abbas and others leaving the matter to God's will. Third, he has powerful theological arguments from God's mercy and wise purpose that the Fire will pass away. Ibn al-Qayyim could use his theological arguments to tilt the balance in favor of Companion reports that the Fire will pass away, but this he does not do. Instead, in Shifa", as in Hadi, he leaves aside his theological arguments and takes his stand with the agnostic strand of reports coming from the Salaf: the duration of the Fire must be left to God's inscrutable will. Yet, it appears that Ibn al-Qayyim is not entirely satisfied with this position. In a later work, he tips the balance in the other direction.
Salafi and Theological Universalism in Mukhtasar al-sawa[iq al-mursala
Ibn al-Qayyim's Al-Sawa"iq al-mursala (The Thunderbolts Sent Out) is an extensive work of theology written after Hadi, which is mentioned in the text. It was the editor of Sawa"iq, Ali b. Muhammad al-Dakhil Allah, who discovered the note on a manuscript of Hadi dating it to 745/1344-45 that I mentioned above. Thus, al-Dakhil Allah concludes, Sawa"iq must have been written after Hadi and after that date. However, Sawa"iq is not Ibn al-Qayyim's final work before his death in 751/1350 because it is mentioned in turn in two later writings. 31 Additionally, Joseph Bell surmises that Sawa"iq was written after Shifa".
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The published version of Sawa"iq and the manuscripts upon which it is based contain only the first half of the work. The editor al-Dakhil Allah was unable to locate any manuscripts containing the second half. As the first half does not discuss the duration of the Fire, we only know that Ibn al-Qayyim treats this question in Sawa"iq by examining Mukhtasar al-sawa"iq al-mursala, an abridgement of the whole of Sawa"iq by Ibn al-Qayyim's contemporary Muhammad b. al-Mawsili (d. 774/1372). 33 The question that then presents itself is whether we may rely on Mukhtasar al-sawa"iq, itself a very large work, to convey an adequate sense of Ibn al-Qayyim's original text and intention. The editors of both Sawa"iq and Mukhtasar al-sawa"iq compare the two to assess the character of Ibn al-Mawsili's abridgment of the extant part of the former. Al-Dakhil Allah, as editor of four hefty volumes of Sawa"iq, is understandably alarmed at the great amount of interesting material excised in Mukhtasar al-sawa"iq, but he does not accuse Ibn al-Mawsili of compromising the text that remains or Ibn al-Qayyim's overall argument. 34 The editor of Mukhtasar al-sawa"iq, al-Hasan b. 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Alawi, observes that al-Mawsili often drops or combines aspects of Ibn al-Qayyim's arguments and sometimes eliminates entire sections but only rarely adds a note of his own or rearranges the order of the text. 35 In short, we cannot know exactly how Ibn al-Mawsili abridged the material on the Fire in Sawa"iq, but, with this due qualification, Mukhtasar al-sawa"iq appears to provide sufficiently reliable access to the main lines of Ibn alQayyim's thought to warrant serious consideration. For the sake of economy, I will refer to Mukhtasar al-sawa"iq from here on as Ibn al-Qayyim's work.
Ibn al-Qayyim discusses the Fire's duration in Mukhtasar al-sawa"iq in the latter half of a long investigation on the problem of evil (pp. 544-690, following Aspect 53 of the second "Taghut"). His style here is much more fluid than in Hadi or Shifa", and he is no longer dependent on Ibn Taymiyya's Fana" al-nar to structure his argument. This corroborates evidence noted above that Sawa"iq is later than both Hadi and Shifa".
Ibn al-Qayyim explains that God's wise purpose in the creation of Iblis and other purveyors of evil is to make known the good from the bad and to bless believers by providing them opposition against which to strive in the way of God. It is objected, however, that this is of no benefit either to Iblis and his minions or to unbelievers who are consigned to merely instrumental roles in God's economy (pp. 625-31). Ibn al-Qayyim responds to this objection in twenty-two points. The first two points (pp. 631-41) and the last four (pp. 686-90) do not deal directly with the duration of the Fire and need not detain us here. The intervening sixteen points deploy the full range of arguments developed in Hadi and Shifa" against the eternity of the Fire and for its passing away to show that everyone will ultimately benefit from God's ways with the world. Ibn al-Qayyim never says clearly that Iblis will enter the Garden, but this is implied (pp. 642-85).
Roughly speaking, Ibn al-Qayyim's arguments in Mukhtasar al-sawa"iq proceed from the theological to the textual. The discussion begins with the long third point affirming that God's mercy will prevail over all (pp. 642-63). The alleged consensus on the eternity of the Fire is not refuted until the seventeenth point (pp. 680-81). Along the way, Ibn al-Qayyim quotes the applicable sayings of the Salaf and interprets the requisite Qur'anic texts. He calls the Fire a whip that God created "to lead His servants to His mercy and His Garden" (p. 664), and he explains that the causes and aims of evil things will pass away and only that which is desired for the sake of God's face will last forever (pp. 670-71). At the end of his tenth point, Ibn al-Qayyim sums up his fundamental theological argument:
These points and others make evident that the wise purpose and benefit in the creation of the Fire require that it remain as long as the cause and the wise purpose for which it was created remain. When the cause ceases and the wise purpose has been achieved, the matter returns to the preceding, overcoming, encompassing mercy (p. 671).
A new argument in Mukhtasar al-sawa"iq that I have not found in Hadi or Shifa" brings out the unfairness of punishing unbelief with eternal Fire. It would go against God's justice and blessing, Ibn al-Qayyim maintains, to consign someone to everlasting chastisement for unbelief and associationism that are of only limited duration. 36 It might be objected that everlasting punishment is indeed fitting for someone who at least intends to continue in unbelief and associationism forever. Ibn al-Qayyim responds that this would benefit no one. Rather, he is confident that the pain of chastisement will achieve the desired result: "It is not in human nature to persist in these means [of unbelief] and to prefer them after suffering harshly from them for a long time" (pp. 656-58, quote on 658).
In Mukhtasar al-sawa"iq, Ibn al-Qayyim also mentions the agnostic option on the duration of chastisement that he presented as his own view in Hadi and Shifa". This time, however, it appears early in his discussion, at the end of his third point on God's mercy. Here, Ibn al-Qayyim does not himself consign the matter to God's will. Rather, he chides those who do not follow his theological and rational arguments to their logical conclusions, and he coaxes and even dares his reader to believe firmly that all chastisement will come to an end. Agnosticism remains an option only for those who lack insight:
Those who say that the chastisement of unbelievers is a benefit to them and a mercy to them circle around this sense and do not penetrate its To reiterate the challenge: Ibn al-Qayyim calls on his readers to bring together the theological arguments from God's names and attributes, the evidence from revelation and the Salaf, and rational considerations of benefit to conclude that chastisement will indeed pass away. Only universal salvation could be of ultimate benefit to unbelievers. To those who cannot yet grasp this, Ibn al-Qayyim counsels leaving the matter to God's will. It is evident that Ibn al-Qayyim has overcome his own apprehension and now believes that everlasting chastisement will definitely end and the Fire pass away. With this, he continues on in Mukhtasar al-sawa"iq, setting out fifteen more points in favor of this view.
Conclusion
In deliberating on the duration of Hell-Fire, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya appropriates a Salafi hermeneutic and a body of Salafi interpretations from his teacher Ibn Taymiyya. For both scholars, the hermeneutic precludes granting authority to any consensus coming later than the first three Muslim generations. Only a consensus among the Salaf is binding. As this does not exist on the eternity of the Fire, the classical Sunni consensus on this matter is called into question. Moreover, some reports from the Companions of the Prophet indicate that chastisement in the Fire will end while other reports leave the question to God's will.
Ibn al-Qayyim also adopts Ibn Taymiyya's theodicy of optimism. All things are ultimately good by virtue of God's wise purpose, and God's mercy will prevail over all. The Fire is a great remedy that purifies and reforms even unbelievers and associators. Ibn al-Qayyim elaborates these arguments far more fully than does his master, but he hesitates in Hadi and Shifa" to adopt them unequivocally as his own. Instead, he leaves the duration of the Fire to God's will, following various reports from the Salaf expressing agnosticism and leaving aside certain Companion reports indicating that chastisement in the Fire will end. In the later Mukhtasar al-sawa"iq al-mursala, Ibn al-Qayyim abandons his reserve and follows the theological argument from God's mercy to its logical conclusion that chastisement will come to an end for all. The predominance of God's mercy and the rationale of therapeutic restoration fully overtake the logic of retribution inherent in the doctrine of perpetual Fire.
Whether adopting an agnostic position on the duration of the Fire and the chastisement of unbelievers in it or arguing theologically for an Islamic universalism without reserve, Ibn al-Qayyim depends on his Salafi hermeneutic to bypass the deeply held classical consensus that the Fire will definitely remain forever. This is a courageous move, even as Ibn al-Qayyim obviously stands on Ibn Taymiyya's shoulders. The Salafi approach to religious authority found little resonance in the Muslim society of Ibn al-Qayyim's day and for centuries thereafter. Yet, it has been widely employed in the modern period, a period characterized by rationalism, displacement of traditional authority, and, for the religiously-minded, desire to return to the pristine original sources of the faith. For Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, as well as for modern Salafis, the Salaf offer an alternative source of authority with which to undermine classical Sunnism and its stewards. As we learn from Ibn al-Qayyim's deliberations on the duration of the Fire, this can open up some intriguing avenues for theological reflection.
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